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Summary findings
Levine and Zervos address two questions: What happens  Stock markets become larger, move liquid, more
to stock market size, liquidity, volatility, and integration  integrated internationally, and more volatile after
with world capital markets after capital controls are  controls on capital and dividend flows are liberalized.
liberalized? And what is the relationship between those  * Easy access to information  about firms is positively
indicators  of stock market development and regulations  associated with the size and liquidity of stock markets.
about information  disclosure, accounting standards, and  *  Countries that officially establish internationally
investor protection?  accepted accounting standards and laws to protect
An analysis of data on stock markets in 16 developing  investors do not have substantially better-functioning
countries suggests the following:  stock markets than countries that do not adopt those
official standards.
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In light of theory and evidence that the functioning of stock markets may affect national
saving rates, the allocation of those savings, firm financing decisions, and economic growth,l
this paper addresses two policy questions.  First and foremost, what happened to stock market
size, liquidity, volatility, and degree of international integration following capital control
liberalization in 16 emerging market economies?  Second, what is the empirical relationship
between stock market size, liquidity, volatility, and international integration and regulations
concerning information disclosure, accounting standards, and investor protection?  To address
these questions, we construct measures of stock market size, liquidity, volatility, and
international integration and then examine the empirical relationship between these stock market
indicators and both capital control liberalization and national stock market regulations.
To examine the effect of international capital control liberalization on the functioning of
stock markets, we test whether indicators of stock market development change following the
liberalization of specific capital controls in 16 countries.  To do this, we first identify event dates
of major policy changes.  We then use Perron's (1989) technique and test for a structural break in
our stock market development indicators at the event date.  As these indicators tend to trend
upwards, we distinguish between unit roots and structural changes in the time series properties of
the series following capital control liberalization.  Although this event study methodology does
not control for other factors affecting stock market development, the same event across a wide
variety of countries and at different points in time yields similar results.
I  For example,  Levine  (1991) and Bencivenga,  Smith,  and Starr (1995) argue  that enhanced  market  liquidity  can
affect resource  allocation  and economic  growth.  Devereux  and Smith  (1994)  and  Obstfeld  (1994)  show that the
ability  to diversify  risk internationally  can influence  national  saving,  productivity,  and long-run  growth  rates. Atje
and Jovanovic  (1993),  Levine  and Zervos  (1995),  and Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1996b) provide  evidence
that the size and liquidity  of equity  markets  is closely  associated  with economic  growth. On the empirical
relationship  between  corporate  financing  decisions  and stock  market  size and liquidity,  see Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  (1996a). Considerable  disagreement  exists,  however. Morck,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1990)  argue that
stock  markets  are a relatively  unimportant  sideshow,  and Shleifer  and Summers  (1988),  DeLong,  Shleifer,
Summers,  and Waldmann  (1989) note conditions  when stock  markets  hurt economic  activity.To our knowledge, the relationships between capital controls and stock market size,
liquidity, and volatility have not been the focus of previous analysis.  To conduct this study, we
measure market size as the ratio of market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  We
use two measures for market liquidity: the ratio of total value traded to GDP (value traded ratio)
and the ratio of total value traded to market capitalization (turnover ratio).  Although these
measures of "liquidity" do not directly quantify trading costs or the uncertainty associated with
market prices, settlement, etc., these indicators do quantify the level of trading relative to the size
of the economy and the size of the market, and are directly motivated by theoretical models of
stock market liquidity (Levine (1991) and Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995)). To measure the
volatility of stock returns, we use an adjusted twelve-month rolling standard deviation of returns
based on Schwert (1989).  We find that stock markets tend to become larger, more liquid, and
more volatile following the liberalization of restrictions on international portfolio flows.
Tlhis  paper also contributes to the large literature on international capital control
liberalization and world capital market integration.  Unlike previous work on integration which
focuses on testing whether world capital markets are perfectly integrated or have a fixed degree
of segmentation, our study examines the effect of specific liberalizations on capital market
integration. 2 We use the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) and the
International Arbitrage Pricing Model (IAPM) to compute monthly measures of integration using
Korajczyk and Viallet's (1989) estimation procedure.  We then analyze the time-series behavior
of these integration measures before and after policy changes. We find that 10 out of 16 national
markets exhibit significant signs of becoming more integrated internationally following the
liberalization of investment and repatriation restrictions.
2For studies  which empirically  evaluate  asset pricing models  that assume that world equity markets  are perfectly
integrated, see Campbell  and Hamao (1992), Cho, Eun, and Senbet (1986), Ferson and Harvey (1993), Harvey
(1991, 1995), Jorion and Schwartz (1986), Solnik (1974), Stehle (1977), and Wheatley (1988). In contrast,
Errunza  and Losq (1985)  evaluate  an asset pricing model  with a fixed  level of market segmentation. Errunza  and
Losq (1985), Errunza, Losq, and Padmanabhan  (1992), Gultekin, Gultekin,  and Penati  (1989), and Korajczyk  and
Viallet  (1989) find that the degree of international  integration  is negatively  associated  with official restrictions  on
international  investment.
2Besides  studying  international  capital  control  liberalization,  we investigate  the empirical
association  between  three regulatory  indicators  and measures  of stock  market integration,  size,
liquidity  and volatility. The three regulatory  measures  are (a) the availability  and quality of
published  information  on listed fins,  (b) the level of accounting  standards,  and (c) the intensity
of investor  protection  laws. We obtain  these measures  from the International  Financial
Corporation's  assessment  of the institutional  features  of emerging  stock  markets from 1986-1993.
We do not believe  that previous  authors  have studied  the links between  these regulatory  features
and stock  market functioning. The data do not suggest  a robust  empirical  relationship  between
stock market integration,  size, liquidity,  and volatility  and the official  imposition  of
internationally  accepted  accounting  standards  or investor  protection  laws. Thus, the data do not
support  the contention  that imposing  internationally  accepted  accounting  and investor  protection
rules will promote  stock market  development. However,  countries  with firms  that widely
disseminate  comprehensive  infornation have larger,  more liquid,  and more internationally
integrated  stock  markets.
We organize  the paper  as follows. Section  I describes  the stock  market indicators  and
policy events in our study. Section  II then evaluates  whether  stock  markets  developed  following
the policy  changes  and Section  III presents  results on the relationship  between  regulatory
regimes and stock market  development. Section  IV concludes.
3IL.  MEASURING STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT
To assess what happens to stock market integration, size, liquidity, and volatility
following the lowering of international investment barriers, we need (1) time-series measures of
stock market integration, size, liquidity, and volatility and (2) dates when countries changed
policies.  This section first describes six stock market indicators that we use to measure
integration, size, liquidity, and volatility.  Although each of these indicators has shortcomings,
using a variety of measures provides a richer picture of the ties between stock markets and policy
changes than if we used only a single indicator.  We also compute two conglomerate indexes to
measure the overall level of stock market development which combines individual indicators.
Finally, the section defines the policy event dates for 16 countries.
A. Definitions, relevance, and problems
We use six indicators and two conglomerate indexes of stock market development.
TIhe  market capitalization ratio equals the value of listed shares divided by GDP.  We use
the market capitalization ratio as a measure of market size.  Although large markets do not
necessarily function well and taxes may distort incentives to list companies, many observers use
the market capitalization ratio as an indicator of stock market development under the assumption
that stock market size is positively correlated with the ability to mobilize capital and diversify
risk.
The value traded ratio equals total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by
GDP.  The value traded ratio measures the organized trading of firm equity as a share of national
output.  While not a direct measure of trading costs or the uncertainty associated with trading on
a particular market, the assumption behind the value traded ratio is that it positively reflect
liquidity on an economy-wide basis.  The value traded ratio complements the market
capitalization ratio:  although a market may be large, there may be little trading.  Thus, taken
together, the market capitalization and the value traded ratios provide more information about a
nation's stock market than if one uses only a single indicator.
4The tumover ratig equals the value of total shares traded divided by market capitalization.
Though it is not a direct measure of theoretical definitions of liquidity, high turnover is often
used as an indicator of low transactions costs.  The turnover ratio complements market
capitalization.  A large but inactive market will have a large market capitalization ratio but a
small turnover ratio.  Turnover also complements the total value traded ratio.  While the value
traded ratio captures trading relative to the size of the economy, turnover measures trading
relative to the size of the stock market.  Put differently, a small, liquid market will have a high
turnover ratio but a small value traded ratio.
The fourth and fifth stock market development indicators measure the degree of financial
integration of equity markets.  In financially integrated markets, capital should flow across
international borders to equate the price of risk.  If international capital controls or other barriers
impede capital movements, then the price of risk may differ internationally. To compute
measures of stock market integration we use two asset pricing models: the international capital
asset pricing model  (ICAPM) and the international arbitrage pricing model (IAPM).
The capital asset pricing and arbitrage pricing models imply that the expected return on
each asset is linearly related to a benchmark portfolio or linear combination of a group of
benchmark portfolios.  In domestic versions of these asset pricing models, the benchmark
portfolios include only securities traded on the local exchange.  The international versions
include all securities.  Since these models are well known and since we use the estimation
procedures clearly explained by Korajczyk and Viallet (1989) and Korajczyk (1996), we only
cursorily outline the estimation procedures.
Following Korajczyk and Viallet (1989, p. 562-564), let P denote the vector of excess
returns on a benchmark portfolio.  In the case of the ICAPM, the benchmark portfolio is the
excess return on a value-weighted portfolio of common stocks.  For the IAPM, P represents the
estimated common factors based on an international portfolio of assets using the asymptotic
principal components technique of Connor and Korajczyk (1986, 1988).  Given m assets and T
time periods, consider the following regression:
5(1)  Ri,t  =  +  biPt+ei,t,  i=l,2.  ......  m;t=1,2.  .....  T
where Ri,t is the excess return on asset i in period t above the return on a risk free asset or zero-
beta asset (an asset with zero correlation with the benchmark portfolio).  If stock markets are
perfectly integrated, then the intercept in a regression of any asset's excess return on the
appropriate benchmark portfolio, P, should be 0.  Specifically, the IAPM and ICAPM plus the
assumption of perfect integration imply that
(2)  al  =  a2=  -am  - 0 .
Korajczyk and Viallet (1989) refer to  ai  as the mispricing of asset i relative to the benchmark
portfolio, P.  Assuming market integration, ai  represents the deviation of expected returns from
the predictions of the ICAPM and IAPM, i.e. a direct measure of deviations from the law of one
price.  Thus, rejection of the restrictions defined by equation (2) may be interpreted as rejection
of the underlying asset pricing model or rejection of market integration.
We are concerned about both positive and negative deviations of a  from zero, so we
interpret estimates of  the absolute value of the intercept terms from the multivariate regression
(1) as measures of market integration.  To compute estimates of stock market integration for each
national market, we compute the average of the absolute value of ai  across all assets in each
country.  Thus, the ICAPM and IAPM measures are designed to be negatively correlated with
integration.  Moreover, if the underlying asset pricing models are sound, the IAPM and ICAPM
integration measures will be negatively correlated with higher official barriers and taxes to
international asset trading, bigger transactions costs, and larger impediments to the flow of
information about firms as illustrated theoretically by Korajczyk (1996).
Two critical estimation issues should be highlighted. First, the ICAPM andIAPM
intm  rely on equilibrium models of asset pricing that the data sometimes rejected
as good representations of the pricing of risk.  However, these measures provide time-series
6estimates  of the degree of market  integration. These  time-series  estimates  then allow us to
investigate  what happens  to measures  of stock  market integration  following  specific  policy
actions. Thus, even if the stock  market  integration  measures  include  a constant bias, the ICAPM
and IAPM integration  measures  still provide  sound information  on the time-series  behavior  of
market  integration  following  policy  events. A second  potential  problem  with the ICAPM and
IAPM  measures  of integration  that we use regards stability. As shown  by Korajczyk  (1996),  the
estimation  procedure  assumes  that the asset pricing relation  is in a steady-state  equilibrium.
Major policy  changes  involving  the liberalization  of international  capital  controls  will induce
changes in the pricing  relationship. In the long-run  (once the new steady-state  is achieved),
enhanced  market integration  will lead to smaller pricing  errors (smaller  absolute  estimates  of ai).
In the transition  to the new steady-state  pricing relation,  however,  Korajczyk  (1996)  shows that
there will be larger  pricing errors. The ICAPM and IAPM  estimates  of ai  will be biased
upwards  during  the transition. Thus, there will be a bias against finding  enhanced  market
integration  following  the liberalization  of international  capital  controls. Even  with this bias, we
find that most countries  enjoy greater  enhanced  stock market integration  following  capital
control liberalization.
VOLATILITY  is the sixth stock  market indicator  that we examine  in studying  the links
between stock  markets,  international  capital  flow policies  and regulations. This indicator  is a
twelve-month  rolling  standard  deviation  estimate that is based on market returns. We cleanse  the
return series  of monthly means  and twelve months  of autocorrelations  using the procedure
defined  by Schwert  (1989). Specifically,  we estimate a 12th-order  autoregression  of monthly
returns,  Rt, including  dummy  variables,  Dit, to allow for different  monthly  mean returns:
12  12
R,=  ajDji+  bkRI-k  +vI  (3)
i-1  k-I
7We collect the absolute value of the residuals from equation (3), and then estimate a 12th-order
autoregression of the absolute value of the residuals including dummy variables for each month
to allow for different monthly standard deviations of returns:
12  12
v  =E  cDj, +  E  dkjlv-k  + P  (4)
. Ik-I
The fitted values from this last equation give estimates of the conditional standard deviation of
returns.  We include this measure because of the intense interest in market volatility by
academics, practitioners, and policy makers.
Each of the six individual indicators -- market capitalization ratio, value traded ratio,
turnover ratio, IAPM measure of integration, ICAPM measure of integration, and stock return
volatility -- measure different characteristics of stock markets, so that each is individually
informative.  We also believe that it is illustrative to construct and examine the relationship
between overall indexes of stock market development and various policy and regulatory changes.
We construct two overall stock market development indexes.  INDEX- I incorporates information
on the market capitalization, value traded, and turnover ratios which are all directly measured
variables.  INDEX-2 also incorporates information on our IAPM estimates of international
integration.
INDEX- 1 equals the average of the means-removed values of the market capitalization,
total value traded, and turnover ratios.  Specifically, the means-removed market capitalization
ratio for country i equals the market capitalization ratio for country i averaged over the 1976-93
period minus the mean for all countries of the market capitalization ratio over the 1976-93
period, all divided by the mean for all countries of the market capitalization ratio over the 1976-
93 period.  Thus, the means removed value of variable X for country i is
x: =(Xi  -x)/IA
where the mean of X is the average value of the Xi's across all countries from 1976-1993.  Then,
we take a simple average of the means-removed market capitalization, total value traded, and
8turnover ratios to obtain an overall index of stock market development, INDEX-1.  Thus,
INDEX-I  gives equal weights to the market capitalization, value traded, and turnover ratios.3
INDEX-2 is the second conglomerate index and incorporates the IAPM estimate of
market integration.  We adjust the IAPM measure of integration so that great values imply
greater integration.  To compute adjusted-IAPM measure, we simply multiply the original IAPM
measure by negative one.  Thus, INDEX-2 equals the average of the means-removed values of
the adjusted-IAPM integration measure, the market capitalization, valued traded, and turnover
ratios.
B. Summary information
Given our focus on the association between major policy changes and stock market
development, we highlight developing countries and use industrial countries mainly for
comparison purposes.  Our sample includes Argentina, Austria, Australia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Spain, Finland, France, India, Italy, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan,  Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.  Furthermore, as a benchmark, we compute stock market
development indicators for the three most developed stock markets:  Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Data are obtained from the International Finance Corporation's Emerging
Market Data Base (EMDB), the International Finance Corporation's annual Factbook and the
International Monetary Fund's Intenational  Financial Statistics.
Table 1 presents the means for each of the six stock market indicators for the 16 countries
that we study plus the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan (JPN) for
comparison.  The six indicators exhibit considerable variability both across countries and across
indicators within the same country.  While Malaysia ranks among the top five countries
3 Furthermore,  we  used  principal  component  analysis  to construct  another  conglomerate  measure.  Specifically,
given the market  capitalization,  total value  traded,  and turnover  ratios,  we compute  the one principal  component  that
is the best linear  predictor  of the three  original indicators.  The principal  components  measure  gives very similar
results  to the INDEX-I  results.
9according  to the market  capitalization  ratio, it has below average  turnover. On the other hand,
Thailand  has an average  market  capitalization  ratio but has a "top five" turnover  ratio.
Argentina  has the most volatile  market,  which  is ten times more volatile  than that of the United
States. In terms of international  integration  as measured  by the APT indicator,  Venezuela
appears  the least integrated,  with a value 2.5 times that of the United States. The emerging
markets have  almost twice the amount  of mispricing  as the average  of the U.S., the U.K.,  and
Japan,  as measured  by both the APT and ICAPM  measures  of integration.
Table  2 presents  the correlations  and corresponding  p-values  of the six stock  market
development  indicators  and the two conglomerate  indexes. The market  capitalization  ratio is
positively  related  to the total value traded  ratio and the indexes,  and negatively  related  to
volatility  and the ICAPM  and IAPM  measures  of market integration. The total value traded  ratio
is significantly  correlated  with turnover,  with a correlation  coefficient  at 0.79. Also, using
different  measures  of integration,  we confirm Harvey's  (1995)  finding  that volatility  is strongly
and positively  correlated  with international  integration  suggesting  that less integrated  markets  are
more volatile.
C. Policy Event  Dates
To evaluate  what happens  to stock market  size, liquidity,  international  integration,  and
volatility  after countries  change  international  capital  controls,  we need  to identify  dates on which
countries  changed  their policies. Selecting  the one or two key dates  when a country importantly
changed  policies  toward international  capital  flows  is both arduous  and, ultimately,  less
systematic  than we would like. We reviewed  the International  Monetary  Fund's
inanalxhangeRions  the International  Finance  Corporation's
Emerging  Markets  Fact Book,  and various World  Bank country  reports from 1980-1993. Based
on this information,  we selected  one, and in the case of Korea  two, period (s) when the country
liberalized restrictions  on international  capital  flows or the repatriation  of dividends. Based on
our review  of the above IMF/World  Bank  documents,  we tried to choose "important"  policy
10changes.  When possible, "important" means corroborated in more than one publication and
described in the reports as "major" or "significant."  We summarize the dates and policy changes
in Table 3.4  Table 3 indicates that most of the major policy changes involve liberalization of
capital and dividend repatriation policies, though some of the country policy events involve
liberalizing capital inflow restrictions.  Thus, the empirical analysis in Section II addresses the
question: what happens to the size of the stock market, the liquidity of the stock market, the
volatility of the stock market, and international integration once a country liberalizes
international capital flow restrictions?
II.  CAPITAL CONTROL LIBERALIZATION AND STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT
A.  Methodology
To examine the behavior of measures of stock market integration, size, liquidity, and
volatility before and after a change in policy toward international capital flows, we begin with an
examination of the time series properties of  each stock market indicator.  If the indicator series is
stationary, we can use a simple comparison of the means of the series before and after the policy
event date to gauge the effects of the policy on stock market development.  If a stock market
development indicator is trending upwards, then no matter where the event date lies, the data will
show that stock market development subsequently rose.
A trending series suggests the possibility of a unit root, which would make a t-test
comparison of pre- and post event date means invalid.  However, traditional tests for unit roots
frequently do not reject the hypothesis of a unit root even when the series are stationary.  In
addition, Pierre Perron (1989, p. 1361) shows how "standard tests of the unit root hypothesis
against trend stationary alternatives cannot reject the unit root hypothesis if the true data
generating mechanism is that of stationary fluctuations around a trend function that contains a
4 A more extensive summary of the policy information  that we collected  to construct Table 3 is available on
request.
11one-time  break." In the present  case,  the inability  to reject  the hypothesis  of a unit root may
instead  imply the existence  of a one-time  break in the series at the policy event date.
Consequently,  we use a multi-pronged  approach  to examine  the behavior  of each
indicator. First, we test for a simple  unit root with lag one, and use the significance  tables
provided  by Dickey  and Fuller (1979)  and Dickey,  Hasza,  and Fuller  (1984). We allow for all
three variations  of the "Dickey-Fuller"  tests: an intercept,  an intercept  and a linear  time trend,
and no trend or intercept. Using a p-value  of 0.05, we evaluate  the null hypothesis  of a unit root.
If the null hypothesis  is rejected,  we can use the simple  t-test comparison  of means for each
indicator  before and after the event date. If the null hypothesis  cannot  be rejected,  we use
Perron's (1989)  technique  to test for a structural  break in the series. Finally,  if there is evidence
of a unit root, and no evidence  of a structural  break  in the series,  we are unable  to make a
statistical  conclusion  regarding  the effect  of the policy  on the stock  market development
indicator.
Table 4 show  the results of the Dickey-Fuller  tests. In every  case, each  of the three
variations  of the tests produce  the same conclusions  regarding  the rejection  (or "acceptance")  of a
unit root. In Table  4, a "YES" entry indicates  the data do not reject  the hypothesis  of a unit root
at the 0.05 significance  level. For every  country,  the unit root hypothesis  cannot  be rejected  for
the market capitalization  ratio. For about  one-third  of the countries,  the total value traded ratio
and the turnover  ratio exhibit unit root behavior. Approximately  half of the countries'
integration  indicators  cannot  reject  the unit root hypothesis.
12Consequently,  for those  series in Table 4 that show  a "YES" entry, we test for a structul
break. As in Perron (1989),  we consider  three different  models  for each indicator  series. The
first allows for an exogenous  change in the level of the series,  the second  permits an exogenous
change  in the growth rate of the series,  and the third permits  both. For indicator  series  y, these
are:
I)  Yt =  1 + (2  -Il)  DUMt +Ft
2) Yt =1  +I  t + (P2 -PI)  TDUMt  +Et
3) Yt  = iL]  + P  t + (i2 -FL 1) DUMt  + (P2 - PI) TDUMt*+ct
where
DUMt = I if t > policy  event date t*, 0 otherwise
TDUMt  = t - t* if t > policy  event date t*, 0 otherwise
TDUMt*  = t if t > policy  event date t*, 0 otherwise.
Tests for a structural  break entail  testing whether  the coefficients  on DUM,  TDUM,  and TDUM
are significantly  different  from zero. However,  these t-tests are only valid if the residuals from
the above three models  do not contain a unit root. Consequently,  we (1) run regressions  for the
above three models,  (2) test whether  there is a one-time  structural  break at the policy event date
for each stock  market indicator,  and (3) use Perron's  calculated  critical values to test whether  the
residuals  from the regressions  are stationary.
B.  Results
Table 5 summarizes  the evidence  regarding  the question  of whether  the policy  event dates
are associated  with a structural  break and a subsequent  rise in stock  market  development  for each
stock  market development  indicator. Three types of entries  are possible. First, if the original
indicator  rejected  the unit root hypothesis,  then  Table 5 reports the results of a t-test comparing
the level of each indicator  before and after the policy  events. Using  monthly data for each
country,  we compute  the average  of each indicator  before the policy event  date (period 1) and use
13a t-test to detect whether the value of the indicator changed significantly following the policy
change (period 2).  If the value of an indicator is significantly larger in period two than period
one, the entry in the table reads "2>1."  Thus, "2>1" shows that the indicator rejected the unit
root hypothesis and that its mean is significantly higher in the period following the policy
change. 5
Second, if the original indicator failed to reject the unit root hypothesis, we conduct a test
of whether the series exhibits a one-time break at the event date. Thus, if the series did not reject
the unit root hypothesis and the series displays a significant improvement at the event date
(defined by the significance of the dummy variable coefficients in equation 1, 2, or 3) Sd  the
errors from this structural break regression pass Perron's test of stationarity, then the entry in
Table 5 is "Y," for yes the stock market indicator improved.  If no significant break is found and
the errors pass Perron's stationarity test, then the entry in Table 5 is "N" for no the stock market
indicator did not improve.  If the series did not reject the unit root hypothesis, and  the series
displays a significant worsening at the event date (defined by the significance of the dummy
variable coefficients in equation 1, 2, or 3) and  the errors from this structural break regression
pass Perron's test of stationarity, then the entry in Table 5 is "W" since the stock market indicator
worsened.
Finally, there were cases where the original indicator failed to reject the unit root
hypothesis, so that we conducted a test of a one-time break at the event date, but the resultant
errors failed to pass Perron's stationarity test.  Here, the Table 5 entries are "?Y?" if a significant
improvement is identified, "?N?" if no significant break is identified, and "?W?" if a significant
worsening is identified.  The question marks highlight that the standard errors on these tests of a
structural break are questionable because the residuals do not reject Perron's stationarity test.
Consider, for example, Portugal's entry in Table 5.  The ND entry under volatility
indicates we do not have monthly individual stock price data for Portugal.  All of the other
indicators show that stock markets significantly developed in Portugal following liberalization of
5  Appendix  2 contains  the  actual  means  of each  indicator  for each  country  before  and  after  the  policy  event  date.
14dividend repatriation by foreign investors in Portugal.  For the IAPM indicator, this finding
required the use of a one time trend break specification at the policy event date.  The resultant
errors from this specification passed Perron's stationarity test.  Thus, under IAPM a "Y" appears
for Portugal.  For the market capitalization ratio, we use a trend break specification.  While the
results are significant, the errors do not reject the null hypothesis of a nonstationary series.  Thus,
the entry is "?Y?" under market capitalization/GDP.  The total value traded and turnover ratios,
the ICAPM integration measure and the two conglomerate indexes display significant
improvements following the liberalization of dividend repatriation restrictions and reject the
hypothesis of a nonstationary series.
The Table 5 results indicate that stock market size, liquidity, and international integration
tend to improve following capital control liberalization.  The INDEX-I measure of overall stock
market development rose significantly in 13 out of 16 countries.  One additional country enjoyed
significant improvement but the errors did not pass Perron's stationarity test.  No country's level
of stock market development significantly fell following reform. The INDEX-2 results are not
much different. Significant stock market development follows international capital liberalization.
Finally, for those cases in Table 5 where the errors from the trend specification did not
pass Perron's stationarity test, we graph the actual and fitted values from the model where we
allowed a change in the intercept and growth rate at the event date.  In several cases, the indicator
undergoes an obvious change in its time series behavior at or near the event date.  For example,
consider Figures 1 - 7.  Figure I clearly indicates a structural shift in Argentina's market
capitalization rate at the event date.  Although the errors may not pass Perron's test, this picture
illustrates that it is appropriate to put  in "Y" in Table 6.  The market capitalization rose
following international capital flow liberalization.  Figures 2 - 7 also show that, although the
errors do not statistically reject nonstationarity, the data clearly exhibit a structural break at the
point of policy liberalization.
Using this subjective graphical tool, we construct a final summary table, Table 6.  In
Table 6, the entries are a simple Y, N, ?, or NS.  A "Y" shows significantly greater stock market
15development  following liberalization.  An entry of "?" suggests that our tests indicate a positive
affect on stock market development, though the indicator still contains a unit root so that the
results remain inconclusive.  An entry of "N" shows that the stock market development worsened
following liberalization.
The "Y" entries  - indicating greater stock market development following liberalization -
dominate Table 6.  There are no N entries under the market capitalization, total value traded,
IAPM, INDEX- I, or INDEX-2 entries.  Only Argentina has a N entry under the CAPM and
ICAPM indicators.  The conglomerate INDEXES significantly rise in 13 out of 16 countries
following liberalization.  Stock market capitalization growth, enhanced liquidity, and greater
integration follows liberalization of international capital and dividend flows.
These results have at least two implications: the first is direct, while the second requires
an additional layer of analysis.  First, measures of stock market size, liquidity, and international
integration tend to improve following the reduction of impediments to international capital and
dividend flows.  Although this paper's findings do not establish a causal link running from policy
to stock market development, the results are consistent with the view that international capital
flow liberalization may be a useful policy tool for countries seeking to boost stock market
development.  A second potential implication builds on other research.  Levine and Zervos
(1995) show that countries with more liquid stock markets tend to enjoy faster rates of real per
capita GDP over subsequent decades even after controlling for many other economic, political,
and legal factors affecting long-run growth.  Thus, increases in stock market liquidity tend to
follow international capital flow liberalization and countries with greater stock market liquidity
grow faster over future decades.
16III.  REGULATORY REGIMES
A. Description  of regulatory  regimes
Many regulatory and institutional factors may influence the functioning of stock markets.
For example, reliable information about firms and financial intermediaries may enhance investor
participation in equity markets.  Regulations and institutions that instill investor confidence in
brokers and other capital market intermediaries should encourage investment through and trading
in the stock market.  Similarly, restrictive or costly regulations may impede the efficient
functioning of stock markets.
To assess the relationship between stock market development and several regulatory and
institutional features of emerging stock markets, we use indicators constructed by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC).  These indicators are available on an annual basis from
1986-1993, for twenty developing countries.  Table 7 gives the average of these indicators over
this period, for each country.  The first column shows whether the country's firms provide
comprehensive, internationally published information such as the P/E ratios and yields.  The IFC
gives a value of 0 if information is published and a value of 1 when the information is
comprehensive and published internationally.  Column 2 gives information on accounting
standards.  The IFC assigns values of 0, 1, or 2 for countries with poor, adequate, or
internationally accepted accounting standards, where "internationally accepted" incorporates the
standards used in major industrialized countries.  Column 3 gives information on investor
protection laws.  Again, 0 indicates poor, 1 signifies adequate, and 2 means internationally
accepted investor protection laws as judged by the IFC. Finally, the last three columns give IFC
evaluations of the types of policies investigated earlier in this paper;  they classify restrictions on
dividend and capital repatriation, and entry into the stock market into "restricted" with a value of
0, "some restrictions" with a value of 1 or "free" with a value of 2.6
6  Furthermore, the Appendix examines what happens to stock market development  following  the creation of
closed-end  country funds on the New York Stock Exchange  or the London Stock Exchange. Although  there is
little impact  on integration,  market  size and liquidity  rise after the inception  of country  closed-end  mutual  funds.
17Table 7 shows that Jordan freely allows international capital flows cross its borders, but
does not publish regular price-earnings information and has relatively poor accounting standards.
India has accounting standards of internationally accepted quality, but restricted capital inflows
and the repatriation of capital and dividends.  Nigeria tightly restricted capital flows over most of
the period and did not publish price-earnings on firms in a comprehensive and internationally
accepted manner.  In contrast, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand ranked high in all categories,
offering a relatively strong investor protection, comprehensive and widely published information
on firms, and free environment for domestic and foreign investors in the stock market.
B. Simple comparison of means across regulatory regimes
Because we only have eight years of data with classifications of regulatory regimes, we
group country-year observations together by each regime classification.  For instance, for the
investor protection classification "O,"  we combine Argentina's 1988 observation with Nigeria's
1990 observation.  To make these groupings comparable across countries, we extract country
effects from each indicator.  Thus, we subtract each country's mean before we group them with
other countries.  This is analogous to regressions that control for country-fixed-effects.  We
compute conglomerate indices of stock market development that are analogous to INDEX-I  and
INDEX-2 above.  Specifically, the new indices, INDEX- 1* synthesizes information on the
market capitalization ratio, the value traded ratio, the turnover ratio, while INDEX-2* combines
these three variables with the IAPM measure of integration. 7
Using t-tests of the differences in the means, we investigate whether stock market
development, as measured by the grouped indicator indexes, is significantly different across
regulatory regimes.  Table 8 presents the results.  As in previous tables, "2>1" signifies that the
indicator is significantly higher in regime 2 than regime 1. For Price-Earning disclosure (PE
7 Earlier,  we were  comparing  stock  market  development  over  time  for each  country.  Consequently,  we  computed
INDEX-I  and  INDEX-2  relative  to each  country's  average  over  the sample  period. Now,  we are  comparing
stock  market  development  across  countries.  Consequently,  we  compute  INDEX-1*  and  INDEX-2*  relative  to the
cross  country  average  for each  year.
18Disclosure), there is one row that compares those observations with a value of 0 with those
observations with a value of 1. For the other regulatory indicators - Accounting Standards,
Investor Protection Standards, Dividend Repatriation Restrictions, Capital Repatriation
Restrictions, and Capital Inflow Restrictions - there are two rows.  The row first compares
regimes ranked 2 with regimes ranked 1 and the second compares regimes ranked 1 with regimes
ranked 0.
The results in Table 8 suggest the following conclusions.  First, countries where
information about firms, such as price-earnings ratios, is comprehensive and published
internationally have larger, more liquid, and more internationally integrated stock markets than
countries that do not publish firm information as comprehensively and widely.  Second, the data
give ambiguous  results on the level of accounting standards and investor protection laws.  For
example, the conglomerate stock market development indexes, INDEX-I AND INDEX-2,
indicate that although poor accounting standards and poor investor protection laws are associated
with low stock market development, moving from adequate to internationally accepted
accounting and investor protection standards is actually associated with a drop in stock market
development. 8 Thus, the data do not support the contention that imposing internationally
accepted investor protection rules and accounting standards boosts stock market development.
Finally, the IFC international capital restriction rankings confirm the time-series findings of
section II.  There is a strong positive relationship between stock market development and lower
restrictions on capital flows.  In sum, comprehensive and widely published information about
firms along with the unrestricted  flow of capital and dividends are positively associated with
stock market size, liquidity, and risk pricing efficiency, but reaching some officially defined set
of accounting standards and investor protection laws is not strongly correlated with stock market
development.
IV.  CONCLUSION
8  There  is no statistically  significant  difference  when  comparing  0 with  2 rankings  directly.
19This paper primarily evaluates the behavior of stock market size, liquidity, volatility, and
international integration after sixteen emerging market economies liberalized their policies
regarding international capital and dividend flows. The data suggest that stock markets become
larger, more liquid, more internationally integrated, and more volatile following the liberalization
of restrictions on capital and dividend flows.  This analysis contributes to existing work on the
links between capital controls and integration by studying the time path of ICAPM and IAPM
measures of national stock market integration following specific policy changes for a large
sample of countries.  This analysis also contributes to the literature examining what time-series
properties of  stock market size, volatility, and liquidity after countries reduce barriers to
international capital flows.  The finding that stock market liquidity tends to rise following the
liberalization of international capital controls is particularly noteworthy because Levine and
Zervos (1995) show that stock market liquidity is a robust predictor of long-run real per capita
GDP growth.
The second part of this paper presented summary statistics on the relationship between
three regulatory institutional indicators and stock market development.  The data indicate that
easy access to information about listed firms by domestic and foreign investors is positively
associated with stock market development.  Furthermore, countries with adequate accounting
standards and investor protection laws tend to have better developed stock markets.  However,
countries that officially establish internationally accepted accounting standards and investor
protection laws do not necessarily have better developed stock market development than other
countries.  While suggestive, we need more detailed measures of stock market regulations with
correspondingly rigorous analyses of the effects of those regulations  to provide reliable advice to
policy makers.
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23Table 1 - Means of Stock Market Development Indicators
Country  Market Capitalization/  Total Value Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPM'  ICAPM 2
GDP  GDP
ARG  0.046  0.002  2.932  0.317  5.454  9.883
BRA  0.208  0.041  0.338  0.199  6.165  5.600
CHL  0.489  0.003  0.727  0.065  6.417  5.238
COL  0.063  0.001  0.733  0.057  5.536  4.823
IND  0.171  0.005  4.029  0.043  2.554  2.298
JOR  0.554  0.011  1.859  0.043  2.492  2.007
KOR  0.342  0.033  9.753  0.082  3.574  3.081
MEX  0.200  0.008  4.457  0.107  5.758  5.468
MYS  1.151  0.044  2.599  0.054  3.822  2.443
PAK  0.101  0.001  1.029  0.031  2.574  2.151
PHL  0.216  0.004  2.348  0.070  5.218  4.858
PRT  0.139  0.003  2.043  0.035  3.817  4.852
THA  0.301  0.026  7.677  0.060  3.154  3.164
TUR  0.088  0.004  3.729  0.159  6.439  6.674
TWN  . 2.045  0.149  5.663  4.582
VEN  0.105  0.002  2.080  0.080  6.628  5.202
AVERAGE  0.265  0.009  4.021  0.102  4.547  4.443
USA  0.562  0.327  0.529  0.031  2.466  2.071
UK  0.665  0.253  0.349  0.040  2.706  2.487
Japan  0.662  0.406  0.469  0.035  2.171  2.101
Average  of
Big Three  0.630  0.329  0.449  0.035  2.448  2.220
'IAPM measure  of market  integration.  Smaller  number  imply  greater  integration  with  world  capital  markets.
2ICAPM  measure  of market  integration.  Smaller  numbers  imply  greater  integration  with world  capital  markets.
24Table  2 - Correlations  of Stock Market  Development Indicators,




Total Value  0.283  1.000
Traded / GDP  (0.066)
Turnover  -0.083  0.786  1.000
(0.597)  (0.000)
Volatility  -0.292  0.026  0.127  1.000
(0.084)  (0.880)  (0.460)
IAPM  -0.371  -0.081  -0.002  0.572  1.000
(0.074)  (0.708)  (0.993)  (0.005)
ICAPM  -0.480  -0.198  -0.081  0.838  0.780  1.000
(0.018)  (0.353)  (0.707)  (0.000)  (0.000)
'P-values in parentheses
2IAPM measure of market integration. Smaller numbers imply greater integration with world capital markets.
3ICAPM measure of market integration. Smaller numbers imply greater integration with world capital markets.
25Table 3: Policy Event Dates
Argentina  6/1980  Eased restirction on foreign portfolio investment in Argentina
Brazil  6/1990  Liberalized capital repatriation and capital inflow restrictions
Chile  1/1988  Liberalized repatriation of dividends
Colombia  12/1989 Eased portfolio and direct foreign investment restrictions; also liberalized repatriation
restrictions in 12/1991
India  5/1990  Automatic approval of foreign investment proposals of foreign companies with equity
share of up to 40%; also liberalized capital dividend repatriation in 1992
Jordan  1/1987  Liberalized capital repatriation
Korea  8/1981  Liberalized inflows and outflows of direct foreign investrnent
2/1992  Liberalized portfolio inflows and outflows
Malaysia  11/1986 Culminated liberalization of direct foreign investment and portfolio inflow restrictions
Mexico  5/1989  Liberalized direct foreign investment inflows
Pakistan  1990  Liberalized dividend and capital repatriation
Philippines  1988  Liberalized capital and dividend repatriation; intensified in 1992
Portugal  1988  liberalized dividend repatriation; followed by full liberalization of foreign investment by
residents in 1989 and 1990.
Taiwan  2/1991  opened stock market to foreign investment
Thailand  1988  liberalized capital and dividend repatriation
Turkey  2/1990  Finished 18 month process of liberalizing  portfolio inflows and outflows
Venezuela  1/1990  Liberalized direct foreign investment and portfolio inflows
26Table 4
Dickey Fuller Test Results for
Presence of Unit Root'
Country  Market Capitalization/  Total Value Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPM 2 ICAPM 3 Index- 14  Index-2 5
GD-P  GDP  _
ARG  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES
BRA  YES  YES  NO*  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO
CHL  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO
COL  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO
IND  YES  NO*  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES
JOR  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO
KOR  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO*  YES  NO  NO
MEX  YES  YES  NO*  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO
MYS  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO
PAK  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES
PHL  YES  NO*  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO
PRT  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO
THA  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO
TUR  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO
TWN  ND  ND  NO*  NO  NO*  YES  NO  NO
VEN  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO
"'NO" indicates a rejection at the 0.05 level of the hypothesis of a unit root in the stock market development indicator.  An asterisk (*)  indicates rejection at
the O.10  level.  "YES" indicates the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected.
ND indicates no data available.
2IAPM measure of international integration. Smaller values imply greater integration in world capital markets.
3ICAPM  measure of international integration.  Smaller values imply greater integration in world capital markets.
4Conglomerate index composed of market capitalization/GDP, total value traded/GDP, and turnover.
5Conglomerate  index composed of market capitalization/GDP, total value traded/GDP, turnover, and IAPM integration measure.
27Table  5
Did Stock  Markets  Develop  FoDlowing  Liberalization?'
Country  Market  Capitalization/ Total  Value  Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPM 2 ICAPM 3 Index-1 4 Index-25
-CM  ME_
ARG  9Y?  2>1  2>1  W  NS  2>1  ?Y?  ?Y?
BRA  ?Y?  .Y?  NS  2>1  1>2  NS  2>1  2>1
CHL  2>Y?  D1  NS  NS  1>2  1>2  2>1  2>1
COL  .Y?  Y  Y  2>1  ?Y?  ?W?  2>1  2>1
IND  ?Y?  2>1  N  2>1  ?Y?  2>1  NS  ?Y?
JOR  ?Y?  2>1  2>1  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS
KOR  ?Y?  Y  3>2  NS  1>3;1>2  ?N?  3>2; 2>1  3>1;2>1;3>2
MEX  ?Y?  ?Y?  1>2  NS  1>2  1>2  2>1  2>1
MYS  ?Y?  NS  NS  ND  ?Y?  ?N?  2>1  2>1
PAK  ?Y?  Y  Y  2>1  ?W?  ?W?  2>1  ?Y?
PHL  ?Y?  2>1  N  NS  Y  ?Y?  2>1  2>1
PRT  ?Y?  2>1  2>1  ND  Y  1>2  2>1  2>1
THA  ?Y?  2>1  2>1  2>1  ?Y?  NS  2>1  2>1
TUJR  ?Y?  ?Y?  2>1  ND  ?Y?  ?Y?  2>1  2>1
TWN  ND  ND  2>1  NS  7Y?  Y  2>1  2>1
VEN  ?N?  2>1  ND  2>1  ?Y?  9N?  2>1  2>1
'X>Y indicates  no unit root and significantly  greater  mean of indicator  in period  X than period  Y.
NS indicates  no unit  root, but means  of indicator  are not significantly  different  across  policy  periods.
Y indicates  a significant  iinprovment  in the series  at event  date and errors  pass Perron  test.
N indicates  no significant  break in series  at event  date, and errors  pass Perron  test.
Y indicates  a significant  worsening  the series  at event date and errors  pass Perron  test.
(Note:  increased  volatility  is interpreted  as a worsening  in stock market  development)
?Y? indicates  a significant  improvement  at event  date but errors  do not pass Perron  test.
?W? indicates  a significant  worsening  event  date but errors  do not pass Perron  test.
?N? indicates  no significant  break at event  date,  and errors  do not pass Perron  test.
ND indicates  no data.
2 IAPM  measure  of international  integration. Smaller  values  imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
3 ICAPM  measure  of intemational  integration. Smaller  values  imply  greater  integration  in  world  capital markets.
4Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalizationlGDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  and tumover.
'Conglomerate  index  composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  turnover,  and IAPM  integration  measure.
28TABLE 6
Do Stock Markets Develop  Following  Liberalization?'
Country  Market  Capitalization/ Total Value  Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPM 2 ICAPM3  Index-14  Index-2 5
GDP  GPE
ARG  Y  Y  Y  N  NS  N  ?  ?
BRA  ?  ?  NS  N  Y  NS  Y  Y
CHL  ?  Y  NS  NS  Y  Y  Y  Y
COL  ?  Y  Y  N  Y  ?  Y  Y
IND  Y  Y  N  N  ?  Y  NS  ?
JOR  ?  Y  Y  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS
KOR  ?  Y  Y  NS  Y  ?  Y  Y
MEX  7  ?  N  NS  Y  Y  Y  Y
MYS  ?  NS  NS  . ?  Y  Y
PAK  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y  Y
PHL  ?  Y  N  NS  Y  Y  Y  Y
PRT  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
THA  7  Y  Y  N  ?  NS  Y  Y
TUR  y  Y  Y  . ?  Y  Y
TWN  . . Y  NS  ?  Y  Y  Y
VEN  ?  Y  . N  ?  ?  Y  Y
'"Y" indicates  that liberalizing  policy  has  positive  impact  on the indicator. "T"  indicates  that the indicator  remains  unstationary,  so a defnite conclusion  cannot
be drawn. "N"  indicates  that  the policy  had negative  impact  on the indicator. "NS" indicates  that  the policy  had no effect.
(Note:  we interpret  increased  volatility  as a worsening  of stock  market  development.)
'IAPM  measure  of international  integration. Smaller  values imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
3ICAPM  measure  of international  integration.  Smaller  values imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
'Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  and turnover.
'Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  turnover,  and LAPM  integration  measure.
29Table 7
Institutional Indicators: 1986-1993  Averages
1  2  3  4
Information  Accounting  Quality of  Restrictions  on:
on firns  standards  investor  Dividend  Capital  Entry
protection  repatriation  repatriation
Argentina  0.25  1.00  1.00  1.25  1.63  2.00
Brazil  0.75  2.00  2.00  2.00  1.50  1.50
Chile  0.88  2.00  2.00  1.75  1.00  2.00
Colombia  0.25  1.00  1.00  1.38  2.00  1.50
Greece  0.67  0.43  0.14  1.13  1.00  1.88
India  0.50  2.00  2.00  1.38  1.50  1.00
Indonesia  1.00  0.16  0.83  1.29  1.29  1.71
Jordan  0.00  0.25  1.00  2.00  1.88  2.00
Korea  1.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  1.63  1.25
Malaysia  1.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00
Mexico  1.00  2.00  2.00  1.75  1.75  1.75
Nigeria  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.75  0.00
Pakistan  0.13  1.00  1.00  1.50  1.50  1.50
Philippines  0.88  1.75  1.00  1.75  1.75  1.13
Portugal  0.71  1.14  1.00  1.71  2.00  2.00
Taiwan  0.75  0.25  0.13  1.63  2.00  1.13
Thailand  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.75  1.75  2.00
Turkey  0.57  0.75  0.25  1.75  1.75  1.38
Venezuela  0.25  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.75
Zimbabwe  0.13  1.00  1.00  0.13  0.25  1.13
Figures  in columns 1-4 are 1986-1993  averages. In each year colums  can take the following  values:
Column  (I)  0-=published,  l=comprehensive  and published  internationally.
Columns  (2) and (3), 0=poor,  I=adequate,  2=good,  of intemationally  acceptable  quality.
Column  (4) 0=restricted,  I=some restrictions,  2=free.
The table is based on the information  provided  in the International  Finance  Corporation's  Factbook.
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Tests of Differences in Stock Market  Development
over Different  Regulatory  Regimes'
Institutional  Market  Capitalization/ Total Value  Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPMJ  ICAPM 3 Index-  I4 Index-2 5
Indicator  GDP  GDP
Firm Information 6 1>0  1>0  1>0  NS  NS  0>1  1>0  1>0
Accounting  1>2  NS  NS  NS  1>2  2>1  1>2  1>2
Standards 7 1>0  0>1  1>0
Investor  1>2  NS  NS  NS  1>2  NS  1>2  1>2
Protection 7 0>1  1>0  1>0  0>1  NS  1>0
Dividend  2>1  NS  2>1  1>2  2>1  1>2  2>1  2>1
Restrictions'  1>0  NS  1>0  NS  NS  1>0  1>0
Capital  2>1  2>1  NS  NS  2>1  1>2  2>1  2>1
Repatriation  0>1  2>0  1>0  NS  NS  NS  NS
Restrictions 9
Entry  2>1  2>1  2>1  2>1  2>1  1>2  2>1  2>1
Restrictions 9 1>0  1>0  NS  NS  0>1  NS  NS  NS
'X>Y indicates  a significantly  greater  mean  of the development  indicator  in regime  X than regime  Y.
21APM  measure  of integration.  Smaller  values  imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
3ICAPM  measure  of integration. Smaller  values  imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
4Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  and turnover.
'Conglomerate  index  composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total value  traded/GDP,  turnover,  and IAPM  integration  measure.
60=P/E  ratios published,  1=P/E  ratios comprehensive  and  published  internationally
70=Poor,  I  =adequate,  2=of internationally  accepted  quality
'0=restricted,  I=some  restrictions,  2-free
31Appendix 1: Inception of County  Closed-End  Mutual Funds
Many countries  begin  opening  their stock markets  by creating  a closed-end
country  fund listed on the New York Stock  Exchange  or the London  Stock  Exchange. As this is
another  type of policy  directed  at international  capital  flows, we test whether  the inception  of a
country  fund has an affect  on stock  market development.  The Appendix I Table  shows  the
results for 11 countries. In most cases,  the market  capitalization,  value traded,  and turnover
ratios increase  significantly  after  the inception  of the country  fund. In contrast,  no clear
conclusion  can be drawn  regarding  the relationship  between  the creation  a country  fund and the
ICAPM  and IAPM  measures  of international  integration. The two conglomerate  stock  market
development  indexes  suggest a positive  relationship  between  overall  stock market  development
and country  fund inception.
32Appendix 1
Tests of Changes in Stock Market Development
Before and After the Inception of a Country Mutual Fund'
Country  Market  Capitalization/ Total  Value  Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPM 2 ICAPM 3 Index-1 4 Index-25
g2G
BRA  NS  NS  NS  2>1  2>1  2>1  2>1  1>2
CHL  2>1  2>1  NS  NS  1>2  1>2  2>1  2>1
IND  2>1  2>1  NS  2>1  NS  2>1  NS  NS
KOR  ND  ND  ND  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS
MEX  ND  ND  ND  NS  2>1  2>1  1>2  1>2
MYS  2>1  2>1  2>1  NS  1>2  1>2  2>1  2>1
PHL  2>1  2>1  1>2  NS  1>2  1>2  2>1  2>1
PRT  NS  2>1  2>1  NS  1>2  1>2  2>1  2>1
THA  2>1  2>1  2>1  2>1  NS  NS  2>1  2>1
TUR  2>1  2>1  2>1  NS  2>1  2>1  2>1  2>1
TWN  ND  ND  2>1  ND  NS  2>1  2>1  2>1
'Pairwise  t-tests are used to test the difference  in means  of each stock  market  development  indicator  before and after  the inception  of a country  fund.
X>Y  indicates  that  the indicator  in  period X is significantly  greater  than the indicator  in period  Y (period  I is before  inception,  period 2 is after).
NS significes  that there is no significant  difference  in means  across  periods.
ND indicates  that there is no data available.
2IAPM  measurs  of integration.  Smaller  values  implyc  greater  integration  in  world  capital  markets.
3ICAPM  measurs  of integration. Smaller  values implyc  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
4Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total value  traded/GDP,  and turnover.
5Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total value  traded/GDP,  turnover,  and IAPM  integration  measures.
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Mean Values of Stock Market Development Indicators
Before and After Capital Control Liberalization
Country  Period  Market Cap./  Total Value Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  IAPM'  ICAPM 2 Index-I3 Index-2 4
GDP  GDP
ARG  1  0.0115  0.0002  1.617  0.281  5.644  8.801  -0.537  -0.185
2  0.0658  0.0026  3.595  0.428  4.958  13.066  -0.494  0.339
BRA  2  0.0565  0.0032  4.361  0.184  6.430  5.555  -0.411  -0.049
3  0.3268  0.0141  3.790  0.291  5.318  6.412  0.419  0.539
CHL  1  0.1988  0.0017  0.850  0.065  7.215  5.909  -0.677  -0.137
2  0.5789  0.0038  1.361  0.064  4.680  3.793  -0.140  0.204
COL  1  0.0251  0.0001  0.583  0.053  5.931  4.342  -0.690  -0.373
2  0.0954  0.0010  0.862  0.068  5.055  5.408  -0.730  0.731
IND  1  0.0749  0.0033  5.059  0.036  2.491  2.200  0.315  0.039
2  02397  0.0068  3.343  0.070  2.859  2.773  -0.223  0.233
JOR  1  0.4205  0.0026  0.607  0.044  2.405  1.941  0.343  -0.029
2  0.5714  0.0121  2.026  0.042  2.605  2.094  0.321  0.080
KOR  1  . . . 0.085  4.199  3.727  -0.027  -0.175
2  0.3253  0.0266  8.627  0.081  3.571  3.055  1.002  0.039
3  0.3667  0.0491  13.097  0.094  2.801  1.941  1.200  0.359
MEX  1  0.0672  0.0051  7.477  0.107  6.587  6.031  -0.108  -0.036
2  0.2894  0.0103  3.561  0.103  3.597  3.920  0.185  0.261
MYS  1  0.4891  0.0040  0.820  . 6.661  2.887  0.844  -0.715
2  1.2238  0.0488  2.792  0.054  3.515  2.395  1.331  0.260
'Measure of international mis-pricing based on the APT model.
2Measure of international mis-pricing based on the international CAPM model.
3Conglomerate  index composed of market capitalization/GDP, total value traded/GDP, and turnover.
4Conglomerate index composed of market capitalization/GDP, total value traded/GDP, turnover, and APT measure of mis-pricing.
34Appendix 2, continued
Mean Values of Stock Market Development Indicators
Before and After Capital Control Liberalization
Country  Period  Market  Cap./  Total  Value Traded/  Turnover  Volatility  APT'  ICAPM 3 Index-I 4 Index-2'
GDP  GDP
PAK  1  0.0581  0.0004  0.720  0.030  2.466  1.593  -0.455  -0.311
2  0.1620  0.0025  1.474  0.060  3.173  3.517  -0.562  0.790
PHL  1  0.0712  0.0024  4.513  0.070  9.738  9.374  -0.373  -0.429
2  0.2457  0.0051  2.015  0.069  3.561  3.202  -0.341  0.242
PRT  1  0.1042  0.0018  1.250  . 8.621  15.043  -0.527  -0.478
2  0.1524  0.0030  2.288  0.035  3.097  3.323  -0.304  0.202
THA  1  0.0682  0.0048  6.213  0.056  3.042  3.283  0.232  -0.079
2  0.4172  0.0367  8.561  0.068  3.425  2.800  0.885  0.337
TUR  1  0.0372  0.0001  0.359  . 6.344  8.760  -0.840  -0.761
2  0.1395  0.0066  5.714  0.152  7.205  7.074  -0.026  0.726
TWN  I  . 15.331  0.163  5.110  4.376  2.072  -0.158
2  . 21.389  0.119  3.577  2.174  2.733  0.054
VEN  1  0.0716  0.0003  . 0.041  7.901  4.053  -0.629  -0.547
2  0.1062  0.0026  2.080  0.154  6.161  5.623  -0.584  0.095
'LAPM  measure  of integration. Smaller  values  imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
3 ICAPM  measure  of integration.  Smaller  values  imply  greater  integration  in world  capital  markets.
4Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  and turnover.
Conglomerate  index composed  of market  capitalization/GDP,  total  value  traded/GDP,  turnover,  and IAPM  measure  of integration.
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